The SCS-C03 exam is the AWS Certified Security – Specialty certification, featuring 65 multiple-choice/response questions, 170 minutes to complete, a $300 USD fee, and requires a score of 750/1000 to pass, covering domains like Detection, Incident Response, Infrastructure Security, IAM, Data Protection, and Security Foundations, with delivery via Pearson VUE or online proctoring.
Exam Name: AWS Certified Security – Specialty
Exam Code: SCS-C03
Duration: 170 minutes (2 hours, 50 minutes)
Number of Questions: 65 (50 scored, 15 unscored for research)
Question Types: Multiple-choice (one answer), Multiple-response (two or more answers), Ordering, Matching
Passing Score: 750 (on a scale of 100–1000)
Cost: $300 USD (may vary by location)
Languages: English, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese (Brazil), Simplified Chinese, Spanish (Latin America)
Testing Options: Pearson VUE test centers or online proctored
Exam Content (Domains)
The exam tests your ability to secure AWS workloads, focusing on these key areas:
Detection (16%): Monitoring, logging, and alerting.
Incident Response (14%): Handling security incidents.
Infrastructure Security (18%): Securing AWS infrastructure.
Identity and Access Management (IAM) (20%): Managing user access.
Data Protection (18%): Encrypting and protecting data.
Security Foundations and Governance (14%): AWS security best practices.
Who Should Take It?
This specialty exam targets experienced cloud professionals involved in securing AWS environments, often requiring significant hands-on experience with AWS security services and concepts.
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Sample Question and Answers
QUESTION 1
A security administrator is setting up a new AWS account.
The security administrator wants to secure the data that a company stores in an Amazon S3 bucket.
The security administrator also wants to reduce the chance of unintended data exposure and the potential for misconfiguration of objects that are in the S3 bucket.
Which solution will meet these requirements with the LEAST operational overhead?
A. Configure the S3 Block Public Access feature for the AWS account.
B. Configure the S3 Block Public Access feature for all objects that are in the bucket.
C. Deactivate ACLs for objects that are in the bucket.
D. Use AWS PrivateLink for Amazon S3 to access the bucket.
Answer: A
Explanation:
Amazon S3 Block Public Access configured at the AWS account level is the recommended and most
effective approach to protect data stored in Amazon S3 while minimizing operational overhead. AWS
Security Specialty documentation explains that S3 Block Public Access provides centralized,
preventative controls designed to block public access to S3 buckets and objects regardless of
individual bucket policies or object-level ACL configurations. When enabled at the account level,
these controls automatically apply to all existing and newly created buckets, significantly reducing
the risk of accidental exposure caused by misconfigured permissions.
The AWS Certified Security “ Specialty Study Guide emphasizes that public access misconfiguration is
a leading cause of data leaks in cloud environments. Account-level S3 Block Public Access acts as a
guardrail by overriding any attempt to grant public permissions through bucket policies or ACLs. This
eliminates the need to manage security settings on a per-bucket or per-object basis, thereby
reducing administrative complexity and human error.
Configuring Block Public Access at the object level, as in option B, requires continuous monitoring
and manual configuration, which increases operational overhead. Disabling ACLs alone, as described
in option C, does not fully prevent public access because bucket policies can still allow public
permissions. Using AWS PrivateLink, as in option D, controls network access but does not protect
against public exposure through misconfigured S3 policies.
AWS security best practices explicitly recommend enabling S3 Block Public Access at the account
level as the primary mechanism for preventing unintended public data exposure with minimal
management effort.
Referenced AWS Specialty Documents:
AWS Certified Security “ Specialty Official Study Guide
Amazon S3 Security Best Practices Documentation
Amazon S3 Block Public Access Overview
AWS Well-Architected Framework “ Security Pillar
QUESTION 2
A companys developers are using AWS Lambda function URLs to invoke functions directly.
The company must ensure that developers cannot configure or deploy unauthenticated functions in
production accounts. The company wants to meet this requirement by using AWS Organizations.
The solution must not require additional work for the developers.
Which solution will meet these requirements?
A. Require the developers to configure all function URLs to support cross-origin resource sharing
(CORS) when the functions are called from a different domain.
B. Use an AWS WAF delegated administrator account to view and block unauthenticated access to
function URLs in production accounts, based on the OU of accounts that are using the functions.
C. Use SCPs to allow all lambda:CreateFunctionUrlConfig and lambda:UpdateFunctionUrlConfig
actions that have a lambda:FunctionUrlAuthType condition key value of AWS_IAM.
D. Use SCPs to deny all lambda:CreateFunctionUrlConfig and lambda:UpdateFunctionUrlConfig
actions that have a lambda:FunctionUrlAuthType condition key value of NONE.
Answer: D
Explanation:
AWS Organizations service control policies (SCPs) are designed to enforce preventive guardrails
across accounts without requiring application-level changes. According to the AWS Certified Security
“ Specialty documentation, SCPs can restrict specific API actions or require certain condition keys to
enforce security standards centrally. AWS Lambda function URLs support two authentication modes:
AWS_IAM and NONE. When the authentication type is set to NONE, the function URL becomes
publicly accessible, which introduces a significant security risk in production environments.
By using an SCP that explicitly denies the lambda:CreateFunctionUrlConfig and
lambda:UpdateFunctionUrlConfig actions when the lambda:FunctionUrlAuthType condition key
equals NONE, the organization ensures that unauthenticated function URLs cannot be created or
modified in production accounts. This enforcement occurs at the AWS Organizations level and applies
automatically to all accounts within the specified organizational units (OUs). Developers are not
required to change their workflows or add additional controls, satisfying the requirement of no
additional developer effort.
Option A relates to browser-based access controls and does not provide authentication or
authorization enforcement. Option B is not valid because AWS WAF cannot be attached directly to
AWS Lambda function URLs. Option C is incorrect because SCPs do not grant permissions; they only
limit permissions. AWS documentation clearly states that SCPs define maximum available
permissions and are evaluated before IAM policies.
This approach aligns with AWS best practices for centralized governance, least privilege, and
preventive security controls.
Referenced AWS Specialty Documents:
AWS Certified Security “ Specialty Official Study Guide
AWS Organizations Service Control Policies Documentation
AWS Lambda Security and Function URL Authentication Overview
QUESTION 3
A security engineer receives a notice about suspicious activity from a Linux-based Amazon EC2
instance that uses Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS)-based storage.
The instance is making connections to known malicious addresses.
The instance is in a development account within a VPC that is in the us-east-1 Region. The VPC
contains an internet gateway and has a subnet in us-east-1a and us-east-1b. Each subnet is
associated with a route table that uses the internet gateway as a default route. Each subnet also uses
the default network ACL. The suspicious EC2 instance runs within the us-east-1b subnet. During an
initial investigation, a security engineer discovers that the suspicious instance is the only instance that runs in the subnet.
Which response will immediately mitigate the attack and help investigate the root cause?
A. Log in to the suspicious instance and use the netstat command to identify remote connections.
Use the IP addresses from these remote connections to create deny rules in the security group of the
instance. Install diagnostic tools on the instance for investigation. Update the outbound network ACL
for the subnet in us-east-1b to explicitly deny all connections as the first rule during the investigation of the instance.
B. Update the outbound network ACL for the subnet in us-east-1b to explicitly deny all connections
as the first rule. Replace the security group with a new security group that allows connections only
from a diagnostics security group. Update the outbound network ACL for the us-east-1b subnet to
remove the deny all rule. Launch a new EC2 instance that has diagnostic tools. Assign the new
security group to the new EC2 instance. Use the new EC2 instance to investigate the suspicious instance.
C. Ensure that the Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) volumes that are attached to the
suspicious EC2 instance will not delete upon termination. Terminate the instance. Launch a new EC2
instance in us-east-1a that has diagnostic tools. Mount the EBS volumes from the terminated
instance for investigation.
D. Create an AWS WAF web ACL that denies traffic to and from the suspicious instance. Attach the
AWS WAF web ACL to the instance to mitigate the attack. Log in to the instance and install diagnostic
tools to investigate the instance.
Answer: C
Explanation:
AWS incident response best practices emphasize immediate containment, preservation of evidence,
and safe forensic investigation. According to the AWS Certified Security “ Specialty Study Guide,
when an EC2 instance is suspected of compromise, security teams should avoid logging in to the
instance or installing additional tools, as these actions can alter evidence and increase risk.
Terminating the compromised instance after ensuring that its Amazon EBS volumes are preserved
prevents further malicious activity immediately. By setting the EBS volumes to not delete on
termination, all disk data is retained for forensic analysis. Launching a new, clean EC2 instance in a
different subnet or Availability Zone with preinstalled diagnostic tools allows investigators to safely
attach and analyze the compromised volumes without executing potentially malicious code.
Option A introduces significant risk by logging in to the compromised instance and modifying security
controls during active compromise. Option B delays containment and allows continued outbound
traffic during investigation steps. Option D is invalid because AWS WAF cannot be attached directly to
Amazon EC2 instances and does not control outbound traffic.
AWS documentation strongly recommends isolating or terminating compromised resources and
performing offline analysis using detached storage volumes. This approach ensures immediate
mitigation, preserves forensic integrity, and aligns with AWS incident response frameworks.
Referenced AWS Specialty Documents:
AWS Certified Security “ Specialty Official Study Guide
AWS Incident Response Best Practices
Amazon EC2 and EBS Forensics Guidance
AWS Well-Architected Framework “ Security Pillar
QUESTION 4
A company has a VPC that has no internet access and has the private DNS hostnames option
enabled. An Amazon Aurora database is running inside the VPC. A security engineer wants to use
AWS Secrets Manager to automatically rotate the credentials for the Aurora database.
The security engineer configures the Secrets Manager default AWS Lambda rotation function to run inside the
same VPC that the Aurora database uses. However, the security engineer determines that the
password cannot be rotated properly because the Lambda function cannot communicate with the
Secrets Manager endpoint.
What is the MOST secure way that the security engineer can give the Lambda function the ability to communicate with the Secrets Manager endpoint?
A. Add a NAT gateway to the VPC to allow access to the Secrets Manager endpoint.
B. Add a gateway VPC endpoint to the VPC to allow access to the Secrets Manager endpoint.
C. Add an interface VPC endpoint to the VPC to allow access to the Secrets Manager endpoint.
D. Add an internet gateway for the VPC to allow access to the Secrets Manager endpoint.
Answer: C
Explanation:
AWS Secrets Manager is a regional service that is accessed through private AWS endpoints. In a VPC
without internet access, AWS recommends using AWS PrivateLink through interface VPC endpoints
to enable secure, private connectivity to supported AWS services. According to AWS Certified
Security “ Specialty documentation, interface VPC endpoints allow resources within a VPC to
communicate with AWS services without traversing the public internet, NAT devices, or internet gateways.
An interface VPC endpoint for Secrets Manager creates elastic network interfaces (ENIs) within the
VPC subnets and assigns private IP addresses that route traffic directly to the Secrets Manager
service. Because the VPC has private DNS enabled, the standard Secrets Manager DNS hostname
resolves to the private IP addresses of the interface endpoint, allowing the Lambda rotation function
to communicate securely and transparently.
Option A introduces unnecessary complexity and expands the attack surface by allowing outbound
internet access. Option B is incorrect because gateway VPC endpoints are supported only for Amazon
S3 and Amazon DynamoDB. Option D violates the security requirement by exposing the VPC to the internet.
AWS security best practices explicitly recommend interface VPC endpoints as the most secure
connectivity method for private VPC workloads accessing AWS managed services.
Referenced AWS Specialty Documents:
AWS Certified Security “ Specialty Official Study Guide
AWS Secrets Manager Security Architecture
AWS PrivateLink and Interface VPC Endpoints Documentation
QUESTION 5
A security engineer wants to forward custom application-security logs from an Amazon EC2 instance
to Amazon CloudWatch. The security engineer installs the CloudWatch agent on the EC2 instance and
adds the path of the logs to the CloudWatch configuration file.
However, CloudWatch does not receive the logs. The security engineer verifies that the awslogs
service is running on the EC2 instance.
What should the security engineer do next to resolve the issue?
A. Add AWS CloudTrail to the trust policy of the EC2 instance. Send the custom logs to CloudTrail
instead of CloudWatch.
B. Add Amazon S3 to the trust policy of the EC2 instance. Configure the application to write the
custom logs to an S3 bucket that CloudWatch can use to ingest the logs.
C. Add Amazon Inspector to the trust policy of the EC2 instance. Use Amazon Inspector instead of the
CloudWatch agent to collect the custom logs.
D. Attach the CloudWatchAgentServerPolicy AWS managed policy to the EC2 instance role.
Answer: D
Explanation:
The Amazon CloudWatch agent requires explicit IAM permissions to create log groups, create log
streams, and put log events into Amazon CloudWatch Logs. According to the AWS Certified Security “
Specialty Study Guide, the most common cause of CloudWatch agent log delivery failures is missing
or insufficient IAM permissions on the EC2 instance role.
The CloudWatchAgentServerPolicy AWS managed policy provides the required permissions,
including logs:CreateLogGroup, logs:CreateLogStream, and logs:PutLogEvents. Attaching this policy
to the EC2 instance role enables the CloudWatch agent to successfully deliver custom application
logs without requiring changes to the application or logging configuration.
Options A, B, and C are incorrect because CloudTrail, Amazon S3, and Amazon Inspector are not
designed to ingest custom application logs from EC2 instances in this manner. AWS documentation
clearly states that IAM permissions must be granted to the EC2 role for CloudWatch Logs ingestion.
This approach aligns with AWS best practices for least privilege while ensuring reliable detection and
